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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a model of a rm that raises funds for nancing an
innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin o¤er-
ing) and equity nancing. The model is based on information problems
associated with both ICO and equity nancing well documented in lit-
erature. The model provides several implications that have not yet been
tested. For example we nd that the message complexity can be benetial
for rms conducting ICOs. Also high-quality projects can use ICO as a
signal of quality. Thirdly the average size of projects undertaking equity
nancing is larger than that of rms conducting ICO.
Keywords: asymmetric information, complex information, initial coin
o¤ering (ICO), equity nancing, signalling
JEL Codes: D82, G32, L11, L26, M13
1 Introduction
The importance of imperfect information for rms rasing funds for their in-
vestment projects is well recognized in theory and practice. For example the
pecking-order theory of capital structure (Myers and Majluf (1984)) predicts
that under asymmetric information rms should use internal funds to avoid
information-related cost associated with external nancing and in the absence
of internal funds they should use debt. Equity should only be used as a last re-
sort when no other options are availbale and high-quality rms should not issue
equity. This theory can be applied to public issues of securities as well as to
other forms of nancing such as entrepreneurial nance including venture capi-
tal nance (see, for example, Cumming (2006) or Cosh, Cumming and Hughes
(2009)). Imperfect information is also very important for newly created ways
of raising funds such as initial coin o¤erings (ICOs) (see, for example, Or and
Sadeh (2019)). Furthermore many ideas that make issuing shares undesirible
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under asymmetric information seem to be quite natural for ICOs as well. In
the former case a rm issues shares, in the latter case a rm issues tokens and
although technically shares and tokens are di¤erent but the value of both com-
pany shares as well as its tokens should be positively related to rms overall
value implying similar logic can be applied. For example, if a good quality rm
would issue tokens then a low quality rm would mimick such an action since
the tokens issued by a high-quality rm should have a higher value etc.
Interestingly though, emerging papers on ICO nd di¤erences between em-
pirical evidence surrounding equity nancing and ICOs. For example, in the
case of an ICO buyers of tokens enjoy on average higher rates of return after
issue (Benedetti and Kostovetsky (2018)) than in the case of IPO (initial public
o¤ering) and we do not observe long-term underperformance of ICO rms as
compared to IPO rms at least to the same extent. The average rates of re-
turn for ICO investors are higher than the rates of return on venture capital.
Benedetti et al (2018) nd that the average rate of return for ICO is 78% while
the average required rates of treturn for VC investors is between 20-40% (see,
for example, Desbrières et al (2002)). In this paper we take a closer look at
comparison of equity nancing and ICO under asymmetric information. We ar-
gue that signicant di¤erence exists between pecking-order theory and theories
of ICO. In particular we argue that high-quality rms can use ICO as a signal.
The reason is that prices, production decisions and other parameters arising in
equilirnium for a high-quality rm may not be suitable for a bad quality rm if
the latter decides to mimick the high-quality rm. ICO is a more complex phe-
nomeonon than equity issue. Under equity issue mimicking happen because the
market relationship/negotiations between rm and investors are strongly domi-
nated by one parameter, i.e. the rm share price, where a higher share price of
high-quality rm attracts low-quality rms. Under ICO equilibrium parameters
of the market relationship between the rm and investors are multi-dimensional
and are strongly a¤ected by at least two parameters: tokens price and product
price. We show that in these conditions mimicking a good rm might not nec-
essarily be protable for a bad quality rm even if one of the parameters may
have a higher value for high-quality rm.
Blockchain-based ICOs promised to provide a new source of nancing for
innovative rms. The ICO phenomenon dates back to 2013. Since then, the
number and funding of projects have been growing exponentially, with over $20
billion raised by December 2018 (Coinschedule, 2018). ICO research is also
quickly growing. Theoretical papers on ICOs include, amomg others, Catalini
and Gans (2018), Li and Mann (2018), Govindan and Wilson (2009), Bakos and
Ha laburda (2018), Cong and Wang (2018), Garratt and van Oordt (2019) and
Lee and Parlour (2018). No paper is focused on the choice between ICO and
traditional equity nancing eventhough for many entrepreneurs this issue seems
to be very important.1 In this article we o¤er a model of a choice between ICO
1See, for example, https://blog.polymath.network/minthealth-and-polymath-bring-the-
rst-healthcare-security-token-to-revolutionize-healthcare-a36884f17e4e
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/04/a-conversation-with-carlos-domingo-ceo-
and-co-founder-securitize/
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and equity nancing under imperfect information and analyze what drives rms
to use ICO and issue tokens as compared to more traditional equity nancing
and what empirical predictions can be generated from this analysis.
In our model an entrepreneur with an innovative idea considers launching
a web-based platform for an innite number of periods. The demand for the
product is highly uncertain. Tokens give the right to purchase a product or
service on the platform. Issuing tokens (ICO) helps the rm learn the demand
and improve its decision-making including production (pricing) decisions. Also
the success of the campaign depends on the demand shock that reects the public
perception of the message provided by the rm. Given the blockchain nature
of ICOs, their message to investors is typically more complex than traditional
equity nancing that is more familiar for the majority of investors. So the
shortcoming of tokens is a higher degree of complexity compared to traditional
equity nancing. If the public does not understand some aspects of blockchain
technology or some aspects of ICO o¤ered by the rm or if the message seems to
be too complex, it can result in market mistrust towards the rm that ultimately
leads to the campaign failure.
We rst analyze rm choice between ICO and equity nancing under sym-
metric information. We nd that Modigliani-Miller proposition holds i.e the
rm is indi¤erent between ICO and equity nancing if the amount of start-up
investments is not large enough. Otherwise the rm should prefer equity nanc-
ing. The reason is that, in contrast to tokenholders, equityholders can count on
rm long-term prot. We also nd that the token price increases after initial
issue of tokens. We then analyze the case with demand uncertainty and show
that the choice between ICO and equity nancing depends on the trade-o¤ be-
tween the degree of demand uncertainty (higher uncertainty favors ICO since in
this case it provides more benets for entrepreneurs in terms of learning market
demand) and the message complexity. A higher level of complexity and respec-
tively risk of campaign failure makes ICO less desirable. This is in line with,
for example, de Jong, Roosenboom and van der Kolk (2018) and Bourveau, De
George, Ellahie and Macciocchi (2018) that nd that ICO with higher level of
transparency are more likely to succeed. Finaly we analyze the case with asym-
metric infromation and argue that unlike traditional equity nancing ICO can
be used by high-quality rms as a signal of quality.
Our model provides several predictions most of which have not been tested
sofar. For example we nd that the message complexity can be benetial for
rms conducting ICOs. Also high-quality projects can use ICO as a signal
of quality. Thirdly the average size of projects undertaking equity nancing
is larger than that of rms conducting ICO. Forth, our model predicts that
signalling opportunities exist when the degree of complexity associated with
ICO is not too small nor too large. Fifth, under ICO, tokens market price
signicantly increases shortly after the issue as compared with initial token
price. Finally we show that ICO will be preferred if the degree of uncertainty
regarding market demand is relatively high. Most of these predictions have not
been directly tested.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
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model and some preliminary results. Section 3 provides an analysis for the
model with imperfect information and demand uncertainty. Section 4 considers
the case with asymmetric information. Section 5 discusses the consistency of
the models predictions with observed empirical evidence. Section 6 discusses
the models robustness and its potential extensions and Section 7 is a conclusion
to the study.
2 Basic Model
An innovative rm seeks funds to create a website platform for selling a prod-
uct/service for an innite number of periods. Initial start-up xed cost equals
I. During the operational stages of the platform, if the rm produces qn units,
it costs cqn in total. c equals cg with probability  or cb with probability 1  ,
cg < cb. cg means that the cost of production is low (high-quality rm) and
cb means that the cost of production is high (bad-quality rm). c is the entre-
preneurs private information. The demand for product in period n is expected
to be driven by the following demand function: qn = an   pn, where pn is the
price at period n. an equals ah with probability  or al with probability 1  ,
ah > al. ah means that the demand is high and al means that the demand is
low. Let n be the rms operational prot in period n and  is the discount
factor. Respectively
P
n
n
(1+)n   I is the present value of the rms earnings.
The calculations of n as well as the way the rms earnings will be distrib-
uted depend on the rms nancing strategy. The rm needs funds to cover its
start-up costs and choses between equity nancing2 and ICO.
Under ICO the rm sells tokens for the price t0.
3 The total number of
tokens is normalized to unity without loss of generality. After tokens are sold,
the entrepreneur receives information about the demand in period 1 and uses
the proceeds from selling to cover rm start-up costs and rst-period production
cost. The platform is launched. In each period, the entrepreneur sells tokens
received for selling the product in the previous period. After that the rm
makes its production decision qn. ICO participants buy products o¤ered by the
rm using tokens. We assume that in period 1 (after the initial sale of tokens)
demand is as follows: q1 = (a1   p1), where  = 1 with probability  and 0
with probability 1  .  is the demand "demand shock", "information quality
shock" or "complexity shock" etc. If  = 0, the product is considered as too
complex by the market and the demand for the rms product does not exist.
Under equity nancing, the rm sells a fraction  of the rm. After that
the platform is launched for an innite number of periods. In each period, the
rm produces its products/services and sells them to the public. The rms
earnings are distributed pro-rata according to the number of shares owned by
each shareholder.
2We do not focus on any specic form of equity nancing, eg. venture capital, friends
investments, IPO etc. but rather use just general aspects of equity nanicng. In Sections 6
we discuss the model predictions with regard to specic forms of equity nancing.
3They can be paid for with at money and a cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Euther etc.
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All variables are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Variables and notations description.
Variable Description
a parameter in the demand function
ai parameter in the demand function for the level of demand i; i = h; l
in a model with demand uncertainty
 probability that demand is high
I start-up xed cost
c unit production cost
cj unit production cost for rm j; j = b,g in the model
with asymmetric information
 discount factor
qn quantity produced in period n
tn token price
pn product price
Tn product price in tokens
n rm prot in period n
 demand complexity shock in period 1,  = 0; 1
 probability that  = 1
Initially, the rm is owned by an entrepreneur. Investors/funders and entre-
preneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is 0.
First consider the symmetric information case without demand uncertainty
i.e. suppose that a is known and that market participants are able to perfectly
read the rm message if ICO is chosen, i.e.  = 1. Also c is a public knowledge.
2.1 ICO
The timing of events is present in Figure 1.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm sells tokens to
investors
p0 is determined
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold to
the public for tokens
for the price T1 per item
(in tokens)
The entrepreneur sells tokens on
the secondary market for the price pn
The rm determines qn
Tokens are exchanged for products
for the price Tn per item (in tokens)
Figure 1. The sequence of events for ICO.
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We begin the solution by working backwards. Consider the operational stage.
In period n, the entrepreneur sells tokens for the price tn.
4 After tokens are sold,
the rm determines qn. Tokenholders then use their tokens to buy products.
Equilibrium is determined by the following conditions: 1) after selling tokens
the rm maximizes its prot, which equals qnTntn   cqn (production-incentive
constraint)
2) demand equilibrium:
qn = a  pn (1)
where pn is the cost of the product for the public:
pn = Tntn (2)
(i.e the cost of tokens for consumers (pn) equals the cost of products o¤ered
by the entrepreneur taking into account the demand function). Taking into
account (1) and (2), the entrepreneurs objective function can be written as
(a  c  qn)qn. The optimal qn equals
qn =
a  c
2
(3)
and the entrepreneurs prot (in tokens) equals:
(a  c)2
4pn
From (1) and (3) we have:
pn =
a+ c
2
From (2) we get:
a+ c
2
= Tntn
Token market equilibrium (supply equals demand) is described by the following
condition:
qnTn = 1
This implies:
Tn =
2
a  c
tn =
a2   c2
4
(4)
pn = n =
(a  c)2
4
4Theoretically, the rm can also spot sale products and stop reselling tokens. One can show
that is not an optimal startegy when the market demand is uncertain (see Section 4). Under
symmetric information this strategy would lead to same outcome as with tokens so we omit it
for brevity. This strategy becomes important to consider under asymmetric information. We
will discuss it in Section 5.
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The present value of the rms prots equals  =
P
n
n
(1+)n and the present
value of the entrepreneurs earnings equals
(a  c)2
4
 
(a  c)2
4(1 + )
=
(a  c)2
4(1 + )
(5)
The second term is substracted because the entrepreneur does not sell tokens
during period 1 (it is done in period 0 because the entrepreneur needs to cover
investment cost I as well as the production cost in period 1).
In period 1, equilibrium is determined by the following conditions: 1) the rm
maximizes its prot, which equals q1T1t1 cq1 (production-incentive constraint)
2) demand equilibrium:
q1 = a  p1 (6)
where p1 is the cost of the product for the buyers of tokens in period 0:
p1q1 = q1T1t1 + I(1 + ) (7)
The second term reects the need of the rm to cover its start-up cost. It
equals I(1 + ) and not I because initial buyers of tokens will not be able to
consume rm products at the same period but at the next period so the real
cost for them is higher and takes into account the discount factor. Taking into
account (6) and (7), the entrepreneurs objective function can be written as
(a  c  I(1 + )=q1   q1)q1 = (a  c  q1)q1   I(1 + ). The optimal q1 equals
q1 =
a  c
2
(8)
From (6) and (8) we have:
p1 =
a+ c
2
From (7) we get:
a+ c
2
= T1t1 +
2I(1 + )
a  c
Token market equilibrium (supply equals demand) is described by the following
condition:
q1T1 = 1
This implies:
T1 =
2
a  c
t1 =
a2   c2   4I(1 + )
4
(9)
Note that the inital value of tokens is lower (comparing (4) and (9)) compared
to further periods. Also note that ICO is only feasible if5
a2   c2  4I(1 + ) (10)
5Note that we assume that tokens will be exchanged for products next period after they
purchased by buyers. One can assume that buyers hold their tokens longer. It will not
change our result qualitatively but quantittaively the condition (10) may change depending
on assumption about the average velocity of tokens.
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Otheriwse we will have a corner solution with t1 = 0 (t1 should be non-negative).
Further
p1 = 1 =
(a  c)2
4
  I(1 + ) (11)
Taking into account (5) and (11), the present value of entrepreneurs earnings
equals
(a  c)2
4(1 + )
+
(a  c)2
4(1 + )
 
I(1 + )
(1 + )
=
(a  c)2
4
  I (12)
2.2 Equity nancing
The timing of events is presented in Figure 2.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm selects  and
sells shares
to investors
p0 is determined
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold
to the public
The rm determines qn
Products are sold to the public
Figure 2. The sequence of events for equity nancing.
Consider the operational stage. In period n there are qn items produced.
The rms objective function can be written as (a   qn)qn   cqn. The optimal
q equals
qn =
a  c
2
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
(1  )(a  c)2
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals  =
P
n
(1 )(pn c)qn
(1+)n
 =
X
n
(1  )(a  c)2
4(1 + )n
=
(1  )(a  c)2
4
(13)
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The investors expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:

(a  c)2
4
 I (14)
Under optimal solution the condition (14) will be binded because the rm
can always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
 =
4I
(a  c)2
Substituting this into (13), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot
equals:
(a  c)2
4
  I
As we can see, this is the same amount as in (12). This is not surprising
given that in the absence of any nancial market imperfections every type of
nancing should have the same result (similar to Modigliani-Miller proposition
(1958)) as long as they t into the budget constraints.
Lemma 1. 1) If
I 
a2   c2
4(1 + )
(15)
, the rm is indi¤erent between ICO and equity nancing; 2) If a
2
 c2
4(1+) < I 
(a c)2
4 , the rm should select equity nancing; 3) If I >
(a c)2
4 , the project is
worthless.
Proof. Part 1 follows from the comparison of (12) and (15). Part 2 follows
from (10): ICO is not feasible if this does not hold. Part 3 follows from (12)
and (15). If I > (a c)
2
4 , the project is unprotable under both ICO or equity
nancing, and the entrepreneur will not be interested in undertaking it.
Lemma 1 shows that equity nancing has a "technical" advantage for large
projects (high xed costs I and high variable costs c). Since our focus is on the
role of market imperfections, we will usually assume that condition (15) holds.
In this case both types of nancing are feasible.
Lemma 1 has several empirical implications. If (15) does not hold, equity
nancing will be chosen. The likelihood of this condition to hold decreases with
larger I, larger c, smaller a and higher . It means that the likelihood of using
ICO decreases with the size of the project, the cost of production, and time
value of money or ination rate etc. and increases with demand. Firms select
equity nancing mostly for possibility of collecting a large amounts of capital.
Lemma 2. Under ICO, tokens market price is higher in period 2 compared
to period 1.
This follows from above analysis comparing (4) and (9). Also note that the
di¤erence is directly related to the value of I. larger I implies a larger di¤erence
bewteen t2 and t1.
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3 Imperfect Information
In the previous section, the demand function was known with certainty. In
this section information about demand is imperfect, i.e the rm faces demand
unceratinty where a can have either low or high value and secondly, in the case
of ICO a complexity shock is possible. If the latter is the case, the demand for
tokens is absent and the campaign fails.
3.1 ICO
The timing of events is similar to that on Figure 1. The di¤erence is that after
issuing tokens the rm learns about the demand.
We begin the solution by working backwards. Consider the operational stage.
In period n, the entrepreneur sells tokens for the price tn. After tokens are sold,
the rm determines qn. Tokenholders then use their tokens to buy products.
Equilibrium is determined by the following conditions: 1) after selling tokens
the rm maximizes its prot, which equals qnTntn   cqn (production-incentive
constraint)
2) demand equilibrium:
qn = an   pn (16)
where pn is the cost of the product for the public:
pn = Tntn (17)
Taking into account (16) and (17), the entrepreneurs objective function can
be written as (an c qn)qnpn . The optimal qn equals (note that by the time the
production decision should be made, tokens are sold and pn is determined)
qn =
an   c
2
(18)
and the entrepreneurs prot (in tokens) equals:
(an   c)
2
4pn
From (16) and (18) we have:
pn =
an + c
2
This implies a non-arbitrage condition for consumers (i.e the cost of tokens for
consumers (pn) equals the cost of products o¤ered by the entrepreneur taking
into account the demand function):
an + c
2
= Tntn
Token market equilibrium (supply equals demand) is described by the following
condition:
qnTn = 1
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This implies:
Tn =
2
an   c
tn =
a2n   c
2
4
pn = n =
(an   c)
2
4
(19)
The expected value of rms prot in period n, n  2 is
En =
(ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2
4
The present value of the rms prots in periods n  2 equals
 =
X
n
En
(1 + )n
=
(ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2
4
  (20)
(ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2
4(1 + )
=
(ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2
4(1 + )
The second term is substracted because we have not counted rm prot in
period n = 1 that is considered below.
In period 1 the demand is as follows: q1 = (a1   p1), where  = 1 with
probability  and 0 with probability 1 .  is the demand "shock". If  = 0, the
demand for the rms product does not exist. Equilibrium is determined by the
following conditions: 1) the rm maximizes its prot, which equals q1T1t1  cq1
(production-incentive constraint)
2) demand equilibrium:
q1 = a  p1 (21)
where p1 is the cost of the product for the buyers of tokens in period 0:
p1q1 = q1T1t1 + I(1 + ) (22)
Taking into account (21) and (22), the entrepreneurs objective function can
be written as (a c I(1+)=q1 q1)q1p1 . The optimal q1 equals (note that by the time
the production decision should be made, tokens are sold and p1 is determined)
q1 =
a  c
2
(23)
From (21) and (8) we have:
p1 =
a+ c
2
This implies a non-arbitrage condition for consumers (i.e the cost of tokens for
consumers (p1) equals the cost of products o¤ered by the entrepreneur taking
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into account the demand function plus the amount of investments multiplied by
1 +  because it takes into account that tokens were sold in period 0):
a+ c
2
= T1t1 +
2I(1 + )
a  c
Token market equilibrium (supply equals demand) is described by the following
condition:
q1T1 = 1
This implies:
T1 =
2
a  c
t1 =
a2   c2   4I(1 + )
4
p1 = 1 =
(a  c)2
4
  I(1 + ) (24)
The present value of the rms prots equals the sum of (20) and the present
value of (24):

(ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2
4(1 + )
+
((ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2)
4(1 + )
  (25)
 
I(1 + )
(1 + )
=
((ah   c)
2 + (1  )(al   c)
2)
4
  I
3.2 Equity nancing
The timing of events is similar to that in Figure 2.
Consider the operational stage. In period n there are qn items produced.
The rms objective function can be written as E(an qn)qn cqn. The optimal
q equals
qn =
ah + (1  )al   c
2
(26)
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
(1  )(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
 =
X
n
E(1  )(pn   c)qn
(1 + )n
= (27)
X
n
(1  )(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
4(1 + )n
=
(1  )(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
4
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The investors expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:

(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
4
 I (28)
Under optimal solution condition (28) will be binded because the rm can
always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
 =
4I
(ah + (1  )al   c)2
(29)
Substituting this into (27), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot
equals:
(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
4
  I (30)
Proposition 1. When information is imperfect and complex (demand un-
certainty; complexity shock) but symmetric, the rm prefers ICO to equity -
nancing if
 >
(ah + (1  )al   c)
2
(ah   c)2 + (1  )(al   c)2
(31)
Proof. The proof follows from the above analysis by comparing (25) and
(30).
Proposition 1 implies that the likelihood of using ICO vs. equity nancing
increases with lower probability of complexity shock (higher ), higher demand
(note that the derivative of RHS (right-hand side) in (31) in  is positive) and
rm quality (the derivative of RHS in c is negative).
4 Asymmetric Information
4.1 Signalling by selecting ICO
In this section, asymmetric information exists regarding the cost of production.6
In particular, we assume that, unlike outside investors, rm owners know the
value of c (production cost of their rm). There are two types of rms: c = cg
for type h and c = cb for type b, where cb > cg.
The timing of events is as previously except that at the beginning the rms
type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
Proposition 2. If 1 <  < 2, where
1 =
(ah+(1 )al cg)
2
4 + I(1 
(ah+(1 )al cg)
2
(ah+(1 )al cb)2
)
(ah cg)2+(1 )(al cg)2
4
6 In Section 6, an extension will be considered where asymmetric information concerns the
cost of production.
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and
2 =
(ah+(1 )al cb)
2
4

(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)
4 + (1  )
(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
4
a separating equilibrium exists, where type g selects ICO and type b selects equity
nancing. An equilibrium where type g selects equity nancing does not exist.
Proof. Consider a situation where type b selects equity nancing and type g
selects ICO. First we have
g = 
(ah   cg)
2 + (1  )(al   cg)
2
4
  I (32)
b =
(ah + (1  )al   cb)
2
4
  I (33)
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Suppose that b mimics g and chooses ICO. Since its a multiperiod game we
have to consider di¤erent strategies of a rm when it decides to deviate from
its equilibrium strategy and mimick another type. One approach is when the
rm mimicks another rm decisions in each period. Another strategy is when
rm sells products directly to the public without issuing/reselling tokens. We
start with the analysis of the rst case. Since its a separating equilibrium the
particpants of the game (tokens buyers) continue to believe that the type is g
when observing issue of tokens in any period. In this case rm b prot in each
period equals
n = qnTntn   cbqn (34)
for n  2, where qn =
an cg
2 , tn =
a2n c
2
g
4 and Tn =
2
an cg
. Here qn, tn and Tn
are exactly the same as they if type g ses ICO but n in (34) is di¤erent from
the prot of type g in equilibrium because the cost of production is di¤erent for
type b. It implies:
n =
a2n   c
2
g
4
 
cb(an   cg)
2
=
(an   cg)(an + cg   2cb)
4
And
En = 
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb)
4
+ (1  )
(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
4
Also
1 = q1T1t1   cbq1
where q1 =
a1 cg
2 , t1 =
a2
1
 c2g 4I(1+)
4 and T1 =
2
a1 cg
. It implies:
1 =
a2n   c
2
g
4
 
cb(an   cg)
2
  I(1 + ) =
= 
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb)
4
+ (1  )
(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
4
  I(1 + )
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Therefore the present value of the rms prots equals  =
P
n
En
(1+)n and
the present value of the entrepreneurs earnings equals
bg = 
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb)
4(1 + )
+ (1  )
(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
4(1 + )
 
I(1 + )
(1 + )
=
= 
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb)
4
+ (1  )
(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
4
  I
Comparing this with (33) we nd that the latter is greater if
 <
(ah+(1 )al cb)
2
4

(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)
4 + (1  )
(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
4
= (35)
=
(ah + (1  )al   cb)
2
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb) + (1  )(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
If it holds, b has no incentive to deviate.
Suppose that g mimics b and chooses equity nancing. We have
gb =
(1  )(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
4
(36)
where  is determined by (29) and equals 4I(ah+(1 )al cb)2 because the investors
think that the type is b when observing equity nancing. Using this in (36), we
get:
gb =
(1  4I(ah+(1 )al cb)2 )(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
4
=
=
(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
4
 
I(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
(ah + (1  )al   cb)2
Comparing with (32) we nd that g does not deviate if
 >
(ah+(1 )al cg)
2
4 + I(1 
(ah+(1 )al cg)
2
(ah+(1 )al cb)2
)
(ah cg)2+(1 )(al cg)2
4
= (37)
=
(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2(ah + (1  )al   cb)
2
((ah   cg)2 + (1  )(al   cg)2)(ah + (1  )al   cb)2
+
4I((ah + (1  )al   cb)
2   (ah + (1  )al   cg)
2)
((ah   cg)2 + (1  )(al   cg)2)(ah + (1  )al   cb)2
Note that conditions (35) and (37) do not contradict each other. It is because
the right side of (37) is smaller than that of (35). An example is illustrated on
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. cb = 0:3, cg = 0:1, ah = 1, al = 0:5,  = 0:1, I = 0:3. Area below
circle line: non-mimicking condition for g. Area above dot-dash line:
non-mimicking condition for b.
One can see there is an area where both non-mimicking conditions hold. The
analysis of other strategies is in fact very similar. iIn each period the rm decision
to resell tokens or spot sell depends on the comparison of (ah+(1 )al cb)
2
4 and

(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)
4 + (1  )
(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
4 . b will select the latter if
(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)+(1 )(al cg)(al+cg 2cb) > (ah+(1 )al cb)
2
Its the same condition as (35) when  = 1. Two cases are possible. 1.
1 >  > (ah+(1 )al cb)
2
(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)+(1 )(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
. In this case a separating
equilibrium does not exist because b deviates and mimicks g by issuing tokens
each period. 2. 1 > (ah+(1 )al cb)
2
(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)+(1 )(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
> . In this
case it is more protable for b to continue to resell tokens in each period. A
separating equilibrium exists if (35) and (37) hold as discussed above. 3.
(ah + (1  )al   cb)
2
(ah   cg)(ah + cg   2cb) + (1  )(al   cg)(al + cg   2cb)
> 1 >  (38)
In this case spot sales are more protable for b than reselling tokens. So rm
b would select spot sale in any n > 2 which is the same payo¤ as under equity
nanicng. So to compare prot from deviations and its equilbrium payo¤ we just
need to compare its period 1 prots. in equilibrium it is (ah+(1 )al c)
2
4  I(1+
) and it deviates it is 
(ah cg)(ah+cg 2cb)
4 +(1 )
(al cg)(al+cg 2cb)
4  I(1+).
16
The latter is smaller because (38) holds, so b does not deviate. To summarize:
the crucial condition is (35). If it holds the analysis of all deviation strategies
gives the same conclusion.
Now let us analyze a potential eqiuilibrium where g selects equity nanc-
ing and type b selects ICO. Similarly to the analysis above we nd that non-
mimicking conditions are:
 <
(ah+(1 )al cg)
2
4

(ah cb)(ah+cb 2cg)
4 + (1  )
(al cb)(al+cb 2cg)
4
=
=
(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
(ah   cb)(ah + cb   2cg) + (1  )(al   cb)(al + cb   2cg)
 >
(ah+(1 )al cb)
2
4 + I(1 
(ah+(1 )al cb)
2
(ah+(1 )al cg)2
)
(ah cb)2+(1 )(al cb)2
4
=
=
(ah + (1  )al   cb)
2(ah + (1  )al   cg)
2
((ah   cb)2 + (1  )(al   cb)2)(ah + (1  )al   cg)2
+
+
4I((ah + (1  )al   cg)
2   (ah + (1  )al   cb)
2)
((ah   cb)2 + (1  )(al   cb)2)(ah + (1  )al   cg)2
An example is illustrated on Figure 4.
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Figure 4. cb = 0:3, cg = 0:1, ah = 1, al = 0:5,  = 0:1, I = 0:3. Area below
circle line: non-mimicking condition for g. Area above dot-dash line:
non-mimicking condition for b.
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One can see that the the area where both non-mimicking conditions hold
does not exist.
The right side of the inequality in Proposition 2 puts an upper bound on the
probability of ICO success. The intuition behind this result is as follows. ICO is
very costly if the probability that the ICO message is too complex is relatively
high. In this case the low-quality rm will not mimick the high-quality rm. If,
on the contrary,  is very large, the low-quality rm would mimick the high-
quality rm and benet from the markets optimistic belief about the quality of
rms that use ICO. The left side of the inequality in Proposition 2 places a lower
bound on the probability of ICO success. If, on the contrary, the probability
that demand is absent is very high, it would be benetial for the high-quality
rm to not use ICO and deviate to equity nancing.7
5 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of nanc-
ing.
Proposition 1 implies that the average size of ICO should be smaller than
that of equity nancing. For example as documeneted in Or et al (2019) the
average size of ICO is between 13-16 mln $US while for example the average
size of IPO is 108 million $US.8
Proposition 2 implies that high-quality projects may use ICO as a signal of
quality. This prediction has not been directly tested but seems to be consis-
tent with the spirit of Bourveau et al (2018), De Jang et al (2018), Or et al
(2019) and Benedetti et al (2018) that suggest that in order to be successfull, an
ICO should meet high quality standards including the quality of "whitepapers"
(technical documentation describing ICO), good level of transparency etc. It is
also consistent with an idea that ICO are more likely to succeed if they use KYC
or DAICO procedures that reduce the chances of fraud and ultimately increase
the campaign quality.9 To some extent this result is also similar to some re-
sults about reward-based crowdfunding which is similar to ICO in that investors
have rights to purchase rms future product and also in that rms can use it
to analyze market demand for their product etc. Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther,
and Schweizer (2015) and Mollick (2014) nd that it can serve as a signal of
a projects quality. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs larger fraction of equity is
associated with a higher project quality (Leland and Pyle (1977)). In our case,
ICO implies a higher fraction of ownership held by the entrepreneur. Similar
7Pooling equilibria analysis is available upon request,. it does not bring ay signicant new
results qualitatively.
8https://www.statista.com/statistics/251149/median-deal-size-of-ipos-in-the-united-
states/
9KYC means "know-your-customer" procedure. It requires potential investors to disclosure
their identity before letting them particpate in the campaign (see Lyandres, Palazzo and
Rabetti (2019), Or et al (2019) etc.). DAICO means Decentralized Autonomous ICO. It
repesents a type of ICO with a smart contract that improves the control of token circulation
and reduces the chances of fraud by founders (see Myalo (2019)).
18
results have been found with regard to equity-based crowdfunding. Ahlers et al
(2015) examine the e¤ectiveness of the signals used by entrepreneurs to induce
(small) investors to commit nancial resources in an equity-based crowdfunding
context. They found that retaining equity is an e¤ective signal and can therefore
strongly impact the probability of a fundings success. This result contrasts one
in Chod and Lyandres (2019) where the signal is the fraction of tokens retained
by the entrepreneur. In our case issuing external tokens is a positive signal of
rms quality rather than a negative one as in Chod and Lyandres (2019).
The results of Proposition 2 can be tested by comparing the rates of return
for ICO and equity nancing. Although precise testing would include nding
comparable rms etc. some indirect evidence seems to be consistent with the
predictions of Proposition 2. For example, it seems like in the case of an ICO
buyers of tokens enjoy on average higher rates of return after issue (Benedetti et
al (2018)) than in the case of IPO (initial public o¤ering) and we do not observe
long-term underperformance of ICO rms as compared to IPO rms at least to
the same extent. The average rates of return for ICO investors seem to be higher
than for rates of return on venture capital. Benedetti et al (2018) nd that the
average rate of return for ICO is 78% while the average required rates of treturn
for VC investors is between 20-40% (see, for example, Desbrières et al (2002)).
With regard to other forms of equity nancing it is worth to mention STO.
Fintech companies started to use STOs to nance their projects in 2017. In
security token o¤erings (STOs),10 companies sell tokenized traditional nancial
instruments, like, for example, equity where tokenholders receive rights on a
rms future prots.11 The number of STOs is quickly growing. In January
2018 5 STOs were conducted (monthly) while in November/December 2018
there were more than 20 per month and it continues to grow.12 We have not
found any reserach that directly compares the rates of return on ICO and STO.
The following points are worth mentioning. First the total amount of funds
raised using ICO is much higher than that using STO13 that is consistent with
the spirti of our ndings that signalling opportunities previal in ICO and that
high-quality rms should not use equity nancing including ICO. Secondly some
research shows that low-quality signals are relevent in STO (see, for example,
Ante and Fiedler (2019)).
Corollary 1 implies that under ICO, tokens market price signicantly in-
creases shortly after issue compared to inital token price. The interpretation of
this result is as follows. The rst issue of tokens should cover both xed start-up
cost and period 1 variable cost while all subsequent issues/resales of tokens will
10 In contrast to utility tokens, security tokens are regulated. The legal structures continue
to evolve. In the US, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applies
the Howey test to determine whether an asset qualies as a security. Essentially, investments
are considered securities if money is invested, the investment is expected to yield a prot, the
money is invested in a common enterprise and any prot comes from the e¤orts of a promoter
or third party (Ante and Fiedler (2019)).
11Ante and Fiedler (2019).
12https://hackernoon.com/will-2019-be-the-year-of-the-sto-understanding-stos-security-
tokens-market-potential-over-icos-4d2502227220
13See, for example, https://www.pwc.ch/en/publications/2020/Strategy&_ICO_STO_Study_Version_Spring_2020.pdf
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only cover variable costs in a given period. From the token buyers point of view
the amount of utility is the same in any period and is related to quantity of
oroducts produced by the rm. This leads to lower token price in period 1 that
assures higher demand for tokens and compensate the rm for additional costs
in period 1. Obviously total net prot of the rm in period 1 will respectively
be lower as well which is intuitive since it is a start-up rm. The prediction that
the token price signicantly increases from period 1 to period 2 has not been
directly tested although it seems like ti is consistent with some evdince in Or
et al (2018) and Benedetti et al (2018) that show the token price growth after
the initial issue (see also Myalo (2019)). Interestingly, eventhough the price
of tokens is lower in period 1 but the product price remains the same (in real
terms) and the product price in tokens can be lower. It is interesting to compare
product prices under ICO and equity nancing. Our analysis predicts that if
a signalling equilibrium then the real product price will be higher under ICO
than under equity nancing (comparing (19) and (26) and taking into account
that good-quality rm uses ICO).
Proposition 2 suggests that the existence of separating equilibrium is related
to the value of . It implies that if the level of complexity/probability of ICO
success should not be very low or very high. It means that some degree of
risk/complexity can be bential. If signalling equilibrium does not exist, then
equilibrium is pooling and as we know under pooling the payo¤ of high-quality
type is signicantly rediced because of underpricing. It can happen if compelxity
is abssent/very low (very low ). However, if  is in the range determined
by Proposition 2 and signalling equilibrium exist, the payo¤ of high-quality
type can be higher. To some extent the result that some degree of risk of
campaign failure is benetial is also consistent with the spirit of the results in
some empirical papers on crowdfunding in that higher targets do not necessarily
signal a better quality. For example, Mollick (2014) and Cordova et al (2015)
found that setting higher thresholds does not lead to higher campaign rates of
success. Further research is required. Also we nd that the message complexity
can be benetial for rms conducting ICOs. Also signalling opportunities exist
when the degree of complexity associated with ICO is not too small nor too
large. Finally we show, for example, that the utility tokens will be preferred if
the degree of unceratinty regarding market demand is higher (it increases the
learning value of utility tokens).
Previous results are mostly related to ICO. With regard to equity issues,
our model suggests that rms issuing equity have low quality on average and
will for example underperforma long-term etc. Several interesting points are
worth menioning. Consider for example the link between the size of IPO and
rms quality. A rms IPO decision has been one of the top issues in corpo-
rate nance theory. Over the years nancial economists have formulated and
tested various theories of IPO, including models based on asymmetric informa-
tion, market timing, and many others. Despite the tireless e¤orts, this issue
has not been completely resolved. Pecking-order theory (Myers and Majlu¤
(1984)), for example, predicts that only rms with low expected performance
may issue equity. Therefore one should expect a negative correlation between
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the size of equity issues including IPO and post-o¤er performance. Signalling
theory usually suggests that debt issues can be used as a positive signal of rms
performance (Leland and Pyle (1977)) as opposite to equity issues (negative
signal). Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), Loughran
and Ritter (1997), and Miglo (2007, 2012) analyze the long-run operating un-
derperformance of equity issuing rms compared to non-issuing rms. This
is indirectly consistent with negative correlation between IPO size and rms
operating performance consistent with Miglo and Wu (2014).
Our model predicts that the size of equity issue (eg of an IPO) is positively
correlated with rm performance (according to proposition 1 if I is large all rms
should use equity while if I is low only bad quality rms issue equity) that is not
directly consistent with traditional theories. It also provides an explanation for
negative correlation between debt and protability that is not consistent with
standard theories of nanicng such as the trade-o¤ theory (see, eg. Titman and
Wessels (1988) or mentioned above signaling theory. In standard models if a
good quality rm would issue a large size IPO it will be mimicked by a low
quality rm. In our model a high quality rm will not necessarily be mimicked
by low quality rm. It may happen if a high-quality rm conducts an ICO
campaign with some level of complexity/risk of failure making mimicking this
rm unprotable even for low-quality rm.
6 The Model Extensions And Robustness
Asymmetric information about demand. Suppose that rms have same cost, i.e
cb = cg but receive a private signal about future demand for their products.
One rm knows that a = ah and for another one a = al. This is a less intuitive
extensions since a lot of informational aspects of the problems become unim-
portant in this setting but the main results remain. The high-quality rm will
not be able to signal its quality by using equity nancing and one the other
hand if  is low enough it should be able to signal its quality by using an ICO.
Low-quality rm may nd it unproctable to mimcik the high-quality rm in
some cases.
Di¤erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role of
asymmetric information for ICO. That is why we adopt a relatively simple de-
mand function. In ICO literature (see, for example, Catalini and Gans (2018))
or dynamic monopoly pricing literature this approach is not unusual (see, for
example, Demichelis and Tarola (2006)). The intuitions behind our results (such
as Propositions 1, 2 etc.) are general enough and will hold if mathematically
di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively, a sigicantly di¤erent ap-
proach of modelling the demand side can be taken where individual customers
with di¤erent demand functions are included. This approach is often used in
crowdfunding literature such as Belleamme et al (2014) or Strausz (2016).
This approach is also often used in industrial organization or price discrimina-
tion literature. As discussed in some literature (see, for example, Miglo and
Miglo (2019) or Miglo (2020a)) adopting more complicated demand function
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often leads to similar results.
One can aslo consider di¤erent types of "complexity shock" in the demand
function. When considering ICO complexity we usually assumed that  has only
two values: 0 or 1. In other words, managers receive an "extreme" signal: either
the degree of complexity is good and demand is "normal" or it is completely
non-existant. One can consider an extension of the model where the demand
is as follows: q = (a   p), where  is distributed according to some density
function f(), eg. one can assume that  uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Here
again we nd that when information about market demand is uncertain but
symmetric, the rms expected prot earnings are lower when ICO is used than
when equity nancing is used. It is similar to the result in Section 3. For
the case with asymmetric information we found that depending on f(), two
outcomes are possible. Either a separating equilibrium does not exist or there
is a separating equilibrium, where type h selects ICO and type l selects equity
nancing. A separating equilibrium where h uses equity nancing does not exist.
With regard to a separating equilibrium where h plays ICO, note that if f() is
such that the small values of q prevail then h is not interested in playing ICO.
If however, f() is such that high values of q prevail then l is not intersted in
mimicking l. A separating equilibrium exists under some conditions similar to
the spirit of Proposition 2.
Moral hazard. One can consider to introduce moral hazard in the model.
The entrepreneurial moral hazard takes place because, for example, the entre-
preneurs equity stake in the rm is reduced while his individual e¤ort is costly
and this cost is not shared. This approach is very common in nancing litera-
ture (starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and typically creates an agency
cost of equity nancing. There are many di¤erent ways to analyze moral haz-
ard issues, for example, to explicitely model the entrepreneurs level of e¤ort.
This approach is quite common in contract literature. In nance literature this
approach was used, for example, in Innes (1991). The result of that analysis
reveals the advantage of debt nanicng over equity nanicng which is consistent
with the spirit of Miglo (2020b) where STO has a disadvantage compared to
ICO due to entrepreneurial moral hazard. Our analysis shows that combining
asymmetric information with moral hazard denetely complicates calculations
without bringing signicantly new results.
The distribution of types. In Section 4, which deals with asymmetric infor-
mation we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also very
typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results stand if
one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows14 that most con-
clusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, equity nancing is an
inferior choice compared to ICO. In the case of multple types, however, one may
have a semi-separating or even pooling equilibrium where only the type with
the highest cost (speaking about Section 4) will be indi¤erent between the two
types of nancing and all other types select ICO. Our analysis shows that the
14Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple types games with asymmetric
information.
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results may hold even in a multiple types environment though more research is
required. The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular, our results
show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average quality of
types that choose equity nancing is lower than those that choose ICO, which
is consistent with our basic model.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. In capital structure literature
debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposite to pure equity or pure
debt nancing). So if mixed nancing is allowed in period 1, most results will
stand. For example, if mixing ICO and equity nancing is allowed in period 1,
the spirit of the results of Section 3 remains the same. The fraction of ICO in
the total amount of funds raised by the rm compared to the fraction of equity
nancing depends on a condition which is very similar to condition (31). In
Section 4, a signalling equilibrium may still exist where a high-quality rm uses
a mix of ICO and equity nancing with a larger fraction of ICO compared to
low-quality rm, although restricting conditions will change quantitatively. In-
troducing additional nancing strategies such as debt is an intersting direction.
Most resutls regarding the costs and benets of di¤erent nancing strategies
found in this paper are quite general and do not depend on introduction of more
options in the model. Quantitatively though, some conditions may change. It
is denitely an interesting direction for future research. Note that most exist-
ing theoretical literature on ICO or equity nancing does often consider them
separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of the reasons for this seems to
be that the founders objectives are quite di¤erent in these scenarios (see, for
example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
Token velocity. In our model tokens have a 1 period velocity, i.e tokenhold-
ers use them at the same period they purchased them. One can extend the
model by considering di¤erent level of token velocity. This will not change our
results qualitatively. One can also assume that di¤erent consumers have dif-
ferent preferences between using tokens as an investment tool or as a tool for
purchasing rm products in the future. In our model the token price increases
after period 1 and remains on the same average level afterwards (i.e there is no
upward trend) but it can change from low price to high price depending on the
demand for products in each period. So long-term investment strategy does not
create any consistent prot long-term. One can extend the model by assuming
that the rm has additional investment projects in the future that increase the
rm production scale etc. This is a possible direction for future research.
The main predictions of our analysis are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. The models results and testable empirical predictions.
The Models Predictions
The message complexity can be benecial for rms conducting ICOs.
High-quality projects can use ICO as a signal of quality.
Average size of projects undertaking equity nancing is larger than that of rms conducting ICO.
Signalling opportunities exist when the degree of complexity associated with ICO is not too small nor too large
Under ICO, tokens market price signicantly increases shortly after the issue as compared with initial token price.
ICO will be preferred if the degree of uncertainty regarding market demand is relatively high.
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7 Conclusions
This article analyzes the choice between ICO and equity nancing for an innov-
ative rm looking to fund the development of its innovative business. The topic
of ICO is a highly growing area in research and practice. Our model is based
on two important features of innovative rms dealing with the development of
FinTech related products. Firstly, there are imperfect information problems
related to the developmet of platforms and high degree of uncertainty. A lot of
campaigns fail or turn out to be low quality or even fraud in some cases.15 Sec-
ondly, it is also well known from the literature that equity nancing is usually
accompanied by a good degree of information asymmetry. Empirical literature
discovered some di¤erences between features of ICO rms and equity nanced
rms. We study what can the choice of nancing strategy reveal about rm
parameters. The model provides several implications, most of which have not
been yet been tested. When asymmetric information is important, high-quality
rms can use ICO to signal their quality. This is opposite to traditional the-
ories of equity nancing that should never be used by high-quality rms for
signalling. Among other results note the following. We nd that the message
complexity can be benetial for rms conducting ICOs. Also the average size
of projects undertaking equity nancing is larger than that of rms conducting
ICO. Thirdly, our model predicts that signalling opportunities exist when the
degree of complexity associated with ICO is not too small nor too large. Forth,
under ICO, tokens market price signicantly increases shortly after the issue as
compared with initial token price. Finally we show that ICO will be preferred
if the degree of uncertainty regarding market demand is relatively high.
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